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Abstract In this note we present both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a linear
static state feedback controller if the system is described by an index one descriptor system.
A priori no deﬁniteness restrictions are made w.r.t. the quadratic performance criterium. It is shown
that in general the set of solutions that solve the problem constitutes a manifold.
This feedback formulation of the optimization problem is natural in the context of diﬀerential games
and we provide a characterization of feedback Nash equilibria in a deterministic context.
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1 Introduction
In this note we consider the following problem: ﬁnd a static stabilizing state feedback controller







subject to the dynamics
E ˙ x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t), x(0) = x0. (2)
Here, x ∈
Rn is the state of the system and u ∈
Rm the control.
Problems of this kind naturally appear in studying systems which operate under diﬀerent timescales
∗Corresponding Author
1like e.g. in mechanical engineering where an electrically driven robot manipulator typically has slow
mechanical dynamics and fast electrical dynamics, or in environmental economics where the global
warming is assumed to be a system which has slow dynamics that is aﬀected by various processes
that have fast dynamics. Furthermore descriptor systems sometimes naturally appear in modeling
systems like e.g. the Leontieﬀ model in economics describing the relationship between the levels of
production of a number of interrelated production sectors.
This problem, without the requirement that the control should be of a feedback type, has been
considered by many authors. One of the ﬁrst who considered this control problem was Pandolﬁ
[16]. His results were later on generalized by e.g. Cobb [6] who gave both necessary and suﬃcient
conditions under which the regular deﬁnite control problem has a solution in terms of a transformed
system. Cheng et al. [5] used a similar approach to present a suﬃcient condition under which the
problem has a solution. Bender et al. showed amongst other things in [1] that there is a linear variety
of feedback gains, all of which yield the same minimal cost of (1). In particular they showed that
there are various Riccati equations yielding the same solution. In Wang et al. [19] a parametrization
of the optimal feedback gains was used to show that by an appropriate choice of the feedback gain
for single input systems certain (LQR/unmodeled dynamics) robustness properties can be achieved.
Further important, in particular numerical, results were obtained by Mehrmann and his coworkers
(see e.g. [15], [14] and [2]). Katayama et al. [12] presented a suﬃcient condition in terms of a Riccati
equation formulated in the original state parameters under which the problem has a solution. The
singular control problem (i.e. R ≥ 0) for descriptor systems was analyzed by e.g. Geerts and Zhu
et al. in [10], [22], whereas the H2 output feedback control problem was considered in Takaba et
al. [18]. For multi-person games Xu et al., see e.g. [20, 21], derived some ﬁrst results for descriptor
systems, in particular for zero-sum games assuming a closed-loop perfect state information structure.
Engwerda et al. [8] recently solved the general problem for index one systems assuming an open-loop
information structure.
Based on an equivalence result in linear-quadratic theory we derive in Section III for the general
indeﬁnite linear-quadratic control problem a both necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence
of a stabilizing feedback control. In general this feedback matrix is not uniquely determined (see
[1]). We give a parametrization of all feedback matrices that solve the problem. This result extends
that of [19] where for a special class of systems just a partial speciﬁcation of all these matrices was
given (see Remark 3.5, below). In Section IV we use this equivalence result to characterize all linear
feedback Nash equilibria in the corresponding diﬀerential game setting.
In an example we show how the freedom in the choice of the feedback matrix can be used by the
player(s) to achieve some additional desired system properties. Section V concludes, whereas Section
II states some notation and preliminary results.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present some results that are used in the next section to prove our main result.
First, consider the system
E ˙ x(t) = Ax(t), x(0) = x0, (3)
where rank(E) = r < n. System (3) (or the matrix pair (E,A)) is called regular if det(λE −A)  = 0.
From [9] we recall the so-called Weierstrass canonical form.














where A1 is a matrix in Jordan form, N is a nilpotent matrix also in Jordan form and I is the
identity matrix. A1 and N are unique up to permutation of Jordan blocks. ￿
We will assume that the degree of nilpotency of matrix N is one (i.e. N1 = 0), or, stated diﬀerently,






−1x, where x1 ∈
R




B1 := [Ir 0]Y
TB and B2 := [0 In−r]Y
TB, (6)














































Of course problem (7,8) is not completely speciﬁed, as we did not specify the set of admissible
feedback strategies yet. Throughout this note we restrict the analysis to the set of linear state
feedback controls that stabilize the system for all consistent initial states. Recall that an initial state
x0 in (3) is called consistent if with this choice of the initial state the system has a solution. The
set of all consistent initial states of (3) is given by {x0 | x0 = X[¯ xT
1 0]T, ¯ x1 ∈
Rr}. As was shown in
[11] this set is independent of the choice from matrix X chosen in the Weierstrass canonical form.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of such a matrix is to assume that system (2)
(or (E,A,B)) is ﬁnite dynamics stabilizable2. Notice that this property holds if and only if rank




3. Furthermore we restrict in the analysis to the case that the closed-
loop system E ˙ x(t) = (A + BF)x(t) has no impulsive modes or, stated diﬀerently, (E,(A + BF))
has index one. So the system must be controllable at inﬁnity (or, impulse controllable). That is,
all impulsive modes of (2) can be transformed into ﬁnite dynamic modes using static state feedback
control4. These requirements lead then to the assumption that F ∈ F, where
F := {F | all ﬁnite eigenvalues of (E,A + BF) are stable and (E,A + BF) has index one}.
We now have the following elementary property.
1This is equivalent to the assumption that rank([E AW]) = n, where the image of matrix W equals the null space
of E. Notice furthermore that in that case det(λE − A) is not a constant.
2Formal: (2) is ﬁnite dynamics stabilizable if there exists a feedback u(t) = Fx(t) such that all ﬁnite eigenvalues




0 is the set of complex numbers with non-negative real part.
4Notice that system (2) is impulse controllable if and only if rank[E AW B] = n.
3Lemma 2.2 Assume (E,A) is regular and has index one. Then for all F ∈ F
1. G := I + B2FX2 is invertible;
2. (E,A + BF) is regular.
Proof:
1. To show that matrix G is invertible we ﬁrst note that, with W ∈
Rn×n a matrix which image
equals the null space of E and thus has rank n − r (see footnote 1),
rank(
 













Y TEX Y T(A + BF)XX−1WX
 
).






matrix [W1 W2] has full row rank n − r. Consequently,
rank(
 




Ir 0 B1F[W1 W2]
0 0 G[W1 W2]
 
).
So obviously, this matrix has full row rank only if matrix G is invertible.
2. First notice that (E,A + BF) is regular if and only if det (Y T(λE − (A + BF))X)  = 0. Now
det(Y


















n−rdet(G)det(λIr − A1 − B1FX1 + B1FX2G
−1B2FX1).
Since by assumption F ∈ F, by item 1, G is invertible. So we conclude that the system is regular.
￿
Furthermore we recall from, e.g., [4, p.97] the next property.
Lemma 2.3 Assume C ∈
Rn×m and D ∈
Rm×n. Then the following holds:
1. In + CD is invertible if and only if Im + DC is invertible.
2. If In + CD is invertible then: C(Im + DC)−1 = (In + CD)−1C. ￿
For notational convenience the notation S := BR−1BT is used. In solving problem (1,2), with E = I,
the next algebraic Riccati equation (ARE)
A
TK + KA − KSK + Q = 0. (9)
plays an important role. A solution K of this equation is called stabilizing if matrix A−SK is stable.
It is well-known that such a solution, if it exists, is unique. From [7, Theorem 5.14] (see also [3]) we
recall
4Theorem 2.4 Consider problem (1,2) with E = I, Q symmetric and R positive deﬁnite (R > 0).
Assume that (A,B) is stabilizable and u = Fx, with F ∈ F0 := {F | A + BF is stable }.
The linear quadratic control problem (1,2) has a minimum ˆ F ∈ F0 for J(F) for each x0 if and only
if the algebraic Riccati equation (9) has a symmetric stabilizing solution K =: K∗.
If this linear quadratic control problem has a solution, then the solution is uniquely given by ˆ F =






∗(t) where ˙ x
∗(t) = (A − SK
∗)x
∗(t); x
∗(0) = x0. (10)
Moreover, J(u∗) = xT
0K∗x0. ￿
By using a pre-state feedback u = −R−1V Tx + v one can easily show that the above Theorem 2.4
















x(t)}dt subject to ˙ x(t) = (A + BF)x(t). (11)
Theorem 2.5 Consider problem (11) with R > 0 and (A,B) stabilizable.
The linear quadratic control problem (11) has a minimum ˆ F ∈ F0 for J(F) for each x0 if and only




TK + K(A − BR
−1V
T) − KSK + Q − V R
−1V
T = 0 (12)
has a symmetric stabilizing solution K =: K∗.
If this linear quadratic control problem has a solution, then the solution is uniquely given by ˆ F =







∗(t) where ˙ x





∗(0) = x0. (13)
Moreover, J(u∗) = xT
0K∗x0. ￿
3 Main Result
Theorem 3.1 presents the main result for the one player case. It serves also as a basis for the
derivation of the result for the multi-player case.
Theorem 3.1 Assume (E,A) is regular and has index one; (E,A,B) is ﬁnite dynamics stabilizable
and Q, R are symmetric. Consider the notation from the introduction. Let X =: [X1 X2], with
X1 ∈
Rn×r and X2 ∈











Assume, moreover, ¯ R := R + BT
2 Q22B2 > 0.
The LQ state feedback descriptor problem (1,2) has a solution u = Fx, with F ∈ F, for all consistent
initial states if and only if the next algebraic Riccati equation (14) has a symmetric stabilizing solution
K =: K∗ (that is: σ(A1 + B1 ¯ R−1BT
2 QT
12 − B1 ¯ R−1BT
1 K∗ ⊂
C−) and the nonlinear equation (15) has
a solution F =: F ∗.
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−1B
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∗) = F(I + X2B2F)
−1X1. (15)
If the above equations have a solution, F ∗ solves the problem and the minimal cost is J∗ = xT
1 K∗x1,
where x1 := [I 0]X−1x0.
Proof: From (8) it follows that for an arbitrary F ∈ F
˙ x1(t) = A1x1(t) + B1FX1x1(t) + B1FX2x2(t) (16)
0 = x2(t) + B2FX1x1(t) + B2FX2x2(t), (17)
where, by assumption, (A1,B1) is stabilizable.
By Lemma 2.2 matrix G := I + B2FX2 is invertible. Therefore we have from (17) that x2(t) =
−G−1B2FX1x1(t). Substitution of this into (7) and (8) shows then that the optimization problem




















subject to the system ˙ x1(t) = (A1 + B1FX1 − B1FX2G
−1B2FX1)x1(t). (19)
Next introduce ˜ G := I + X2B2F. By Lemma 2.3: X2G−1 = ˜ G−1X2. So, I − X2G−1B2F = I −
˜ G−1X2B2F = I − ˜ G−1( ˜ G − I) = ˜ G−1. Using this, (19) can be rewritten as ˙ x1(t) = (A1 + B1F(I −
˜ G−1X2B2F)X1)x1(t) = (A1 + B1F ˜ G−1X1)x1(t). Now, let ˜ F := F(X1 − X2G−1B2FX1) = F ˜ G−1X1.
Then, using Lemma 2.3 again, B2 ˜ F = B2F ˜ G−1X1 = (I + B2FX2)−1B2FX1 = G−1B2FX1. Using

















subject to ˙ x1(t) = (A1 + B1 ˜ F)x1(t). (20)



















With Q := Q11, V := −Q12B2, R := ¯ R, A := A1 and B := B1 in Theorem 2.5 it follows that the
minimization of (21) subject to (20) has a solution ˜ F if and only if (14) has a stabilizing solution
K∗. Furthermore, the optimal feedback matrix equals ˜ F = − ¯ R−1(−BT
2 QT
12 + BT
1 K∗). Since by
deﬁnition ˜ F = F ˜ G−1X1, we conclude that problem (1,2) has a solution F if and only if additionally
this equation (i.e. (15)) is solvable. ￿
Remark 3.2
1. As already mentioned before, if (14) has a stabilizing solution K∗ then it is unique. Therefore,
to verify the solvability conditions, the most logical approach seems to verify ﬁrst whether (14)
has an appropriate solution, and next verify the solvability of (15). Now let for H ∈
Rm×n



















6Since X1 is full column rank, it follows then that F solves (15) if and only if there exists a
matrix H such that F(I + X2B2F)−1 satisﬁes F(I + X2B2F)−1 = M(H).
Or, stated diﬀerently, equivalent to the statement that (15) has a solution F is that the matrix
equation (I − M(H)X2B2)F = M(H) has a solution for some matrices F and H. In general
the feedback solution F ∗ will not be uniquely determined. Example 3.4 illustrates this point.
2. Notice that Theorem 3.1 a priori just requires that matrix ¯ R is positive deﬁnite. This implies
that for certain types of problems it is not required in the original problem formulation that
matrix R should be positive (semi) deﬁnite to conclude that the optimization problem has a
solution.
3. Mark that the cost just depends on the initial state related to the dynamic part of the system.
￿
A disadvantage of the above result is that one ﬁrst has to perform some matrix transformations
before one can draw conclusions. Below we present a suﬃcient condition in terms of the original
model parameters to conclude that the problem has a solution. Following [12, 17] consider the matrix
equation
LA + A
TK + Q − LBR
−1B
TK = 0, where LE = E
TK. (22)
and the feedback control
u(t) = −R
−1B
TKx(t) =: Fx(t), where E ˙ x(t) = (A − BR
−1B
TK)x(t), x(0) = x0. (23)
Then we have the following result. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.3 Let L, K and F solve (22,23). Using the notation of Theorem 3.1 assume that
σ(A1+B1F(I+X2B2F)−1X1) ⊂






is symmetric5. Then F is an optimal
solution for the LQ feedback descriptor problem. The corresponding minimal cost is xT
0 LEx0. ￿
The next example illustrates the main result. The example is inspired by systems which operate under
diﬀerent time scales. We consider a simplistic optimal maintenance model where both variables with
fast dynamics and slow dynamics occur.
Example 3.4 Consider the optimal maintenance of a machine. Assume that there is a regular yearly
update of the machine. On the other hand there is a daily routine machine inspection to make sure
that the machine will operate properly during the year. Consider the next model:




(αCD(t) − uf(t)) + βEW(t). (25)
Here (24) models the economic value (EW) of the machine. It is assumed that this value depreciates
over time but that its value can be increased again by either long-term maintain services or invest-
ments (ul). CD models the economic damage if there is a breakdown of the machine during the
5It is easily veriﬁed that this assumption is, e.g., satisﬁed if we impose the additional restriction that L = KT in
(22)
7year6. These cost grow very fast if there is a breakdown. This is modeled by the term α
ǫCD on the
right-hand side of (25), where ǫ is assumed to be small. Furthermore it is assumed that the average
economic damage due to breakdowns of the machine during every year is a fraction of the economic
wealth of the machine (modeled by βEW). Finally the term uf in (25) models the daily inspection














This utility function expresses that the owner likes to maximize the economic wealth of the machine.
However, a breakdown of the machine during the year should be avoided due to its negative impact
on the production process. Furthermore, of course, investment and repairing is costly. The fact
that the daily inspection cost should be low compared to the yearly long-term maintenance cost is
expressed by the weight
1
θ+(1−θ)ǫ for the daily cost. Here θ expresses that there is some lower-bound
for daily operating cost. Furthermore, the total cost for repair every year should be a fraction of
the economic value of the machine. This can be expressed by choosing relative high numbers of the
weights θi attached to the control variables compared to the weight one for the economic value of
the machine. This enforces a moderate use of the control variables compared to the other variables.
The fact that these control variables are quadratically penalized might be motivated by the obser-
vation that the larger these variables are probably the larger the repairing time will be, which will
be disliked by the customers of the product. Given this model the owner likes to design an optimal
repair service strategy.
With ǫ = 0 this problem can be rewritten, with xT := [EW CD] and uT := [ul uf], as the mini-




























. Obviously, for practical applications, the defection rate is an important piece of
information in the decision making about the optimal repair strategy. For that reason it seems to





















α2[−α 1], B2 = [0
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| f4  = α and − δ +





Introducing   := 1
α2 θf
θ +γ
, a := 1
α2θl +
 
α2, b := −δ and c := −α2, (14) becomes ak2 − 2bk − c = 0.
Given our parametric assumptions it is easily veriﬁed that this equation has a stabilizing solution.
Its stabilizing solution is k∗ := b+
√
b2+ac
a . So by Theorem 3.1 all feedback matrices satisfying (15)







| f1 = −
k∗
α2θl
+ ηf2, f3 =
k∗ 
α





6We assume that for a speciﬁc application the model parameters are such that this variable will always be nonneg-
ative.
8where η := −
k∗ 
α2 . Notice that, by Theorem 3.1, for every F ∈ F∗, A1 + B1F(I + X2B2F)−1X1 =
A1 − B1 ¯ R−1(−BT
2 QT
12 + BT
1 K∗) = b − ak∗ < 0.
Next we calculate the corresponding optimal ”open-loop” control for this problem. That is, if we
ignore the potential dynamics of the CD variable and reduce the optimization problem by substitution
of CD = 1
αuf into the diﬀerential equation for EW and the cost function. This yields that the
problem is equivalent to the minimization of J =
  ∞






































EW(t), where EW(.) solves ˙ EW(t) = (−δ−
˜ k
θl − ˜ k)EW(t) and ˜ k is the
stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation α2a˜ k2 − 2b˜ k − c
α2 = 0. It is easily veriﬁed from
this that ˜ k = k∗
α2.











ǫβ − α˜ k  α
 
x(t).
Some elementary analysis shows that the eigenvalues of this system will converge to −δ −
˜ k
θl −  ˜ k
and α
ǫ if ǫ converges to zero. So, for small ǫ, this control will in fact produce a destabilizing control
instead of a stabilizing one. Since α > 0 in (25) this point was to be expected from [13].
On the other hand we see that if we use a state feedback control [ul uf]T = Fx(t), where F belongs







−δ + f1 −1 + f2




b − ak∗ + η(f2 − 1) f2 − 1
ǫβ + η(α − f4) α − f4
 
x(t).
Introducing g := −(b − ak∗), g2 := f2 − 1 and g4 := α − f4, it is easily veriﬁed that the eigenvalues









ǫ + 4βg2}. From this
it is obvious that this system will be stable for small ǫ iﬀ g4 < 0, i.e. f4 > α. In fact the system will
be stable for all ǫ > 0 if additionally we choose f2 such that η(f2 − 1) < 0.
This freedom in choosing f2 and f4 can be used to attain some additional goals like, e.g., minimizing
the norm of F. It is easily veriﬁed that the norm minimizing f2 and f4 are given by k∗
α2θl(1+η) and
−k∗ 
α(1+η), respectively. In Figure 1 we plotted two typical responses in case ǫ = 0.1; and the model
parameters are δ = 0.1; α = 1; β = 0.05; γ = 25; θ = 0.005; θl = 200; θf = 200 and f4 = 1.1.
The choice of f4 is inspired by the fact that f4 must be larger than 1 and the norm of F should be
small (the norm minimizing value for f4 is 0.00015), whereas f2 = −0.0293 minimizes the norm of F.
Figure 1a shows the controls if f2 = −0.0293 whereas Figure 1b shows these results if f2 = 0.9. Figure
1a shows that the norm minimizing control implies a daily inspection that is the ﬁrst period small,
followed by a rapid increase of them and next a steady decline, whereas the long term maintenance
cost gradually decline. In particular the daily inspection response diﬀers if a non-norm minimizing
feedback is chosen which is illustrated in Figure 1b. ￿







(a) Control trajectories if f2 = −0.0293.







(b) Control trajectories if f2 = 0.9.
Figure 1: Example 3.4, with ǫ = 0.1, f4 = 1.1 and x(0) = [100 1]T.















, Q = R = I2. Then








satisﬁes (14,15). Next consider [19]. It is easily veriﬁed that in [19, (10)] matrix T3 = 0. Therefore,
by [19, (13)] Li = 0 too. According [19, (7,8)] the set of optimal feedback gain matrices is then





(with p0 = 1 −
√
2). Clearly F and ˜ F only coincide if f22 = 0.
This shows that the parametrization given in [19] does not completely specify the set of all optimal
feedback gain matrices.
2. In case we choose in Example 3.4 in the model equations δ = 2, α = 1 and ǫ = 0 (i.e. equation
(25) is replaced by 0 = CD(t) − uf(t)), and in the objective function γ = θl = θf =
1
2 and θ = 1,






(with k∗ = −1
3 ). However, equations
(22, 23) do not have this solution F ∗. For, if these equations would have this solution then, since by







. But it is easily veriﬁed that in that case
the equation LE = ETK does not have a solution L. This demonstrates that Proposition 3.3 only
provides a suﬃcient condition for the existence of an optimal solution. ￿
Example 3.6 This model serves to illustrate a case where we do not a priori reduce the number of
variables in the model.
Consider a consumer who has to decide about his saving pattern assuming that his labor income
will decline over time. His consumption at time t consists of his labor income, dividends paid by his
portfolio minus the cost of investing a part u(t) in an additional portfolio. The expected long run
yield of his portfolio is assumed to be r. Let W(t) denote his labor income, C(t) his consumption,
S(t) the value of his portfolio and u(t) the change in the portfolio, all at time t. Assume that
the consumer wants to maximize the following utility function, where for simplicity we skipped a





2(t) − ¯ γu
2(t)dt
subject to the constraints:
˙ W(t) = −αW(t), W(0) = W0; ˙ S(t) = rS(t) + u(t), x(0) = x0 and C(t) = W(t) + νS(t) − u(t).
Here νS models the paid long run expected dividends. All parameters are assumed to be positive.
The parameter γ can be interpreted as a habit formation parameter, modeling the fact that the
consumer is reluctant to change his portfolio. Within our standard framework this means that with




















x(t) + ¯ γu










































 and ¯ R = ¯ γ−1 =:
γ.
Furthermore it is easily veriﬁed that F = {[f1 f2 f3] | f3  = −1 and x(t) → 0 in E ˙ x(t) = (A +
BF)x(t)}.
Next consider the algebraic Riccati equation (14). Elementary calculations show that this equation




γ ν. Assuming that this condition is satisﬁed
its solution is, with β :=
 















γα+β γr − ν + β
 
.
Notice that k1 < 0, k2 < 0 and k3 > 0. A simple elaboration of (15) shows that all feedback matrices
satisfying




γ + 1 + k2
γ








yield a solution for the problem. So in particular f3 can be chosen such that the control becomes
just a function of two out of the three state variables. Another choice for f3 can be motivated by
choosing that value that yields some additional robustness properties for the proposed control. In
11this case one might chose f3 such that the proposed feedback will be close to optimal too in case the
expected long run yield of the portfolio is smaller than r. Assume that ¯ r is a conservative estimate
for the yield. Then f3 can be chosen such that   F(r)−F(¯ r)   is minimal. This problem can simply
be rewritten as the minimization of the distance between two lines in
R3. Its solution is left as an
exercise for the reader.






From this we infer that if the initial income of the consumer just consists of his labor income W0 and








, subject to S0 + C0 = W0,C0 ≥ ¯ C, (29)
where ¯ C is some minimum amount of consumption. Some elementary calculations show that the
solution for this problem is S0 = min{W0− ¯ C,−
k2
k3W0}. So, the higher the initial income is the more
will be invested in the portfolio. Furthermore, we see that the fraction of initial income that will be
invested in the portfolio declines with a factor 1
γ if γ grows. ￿
4 An application to LQ diﬀerential games
In this section we use the equivalence result from Theorem 3.1 to characterize feedback Nash equilibria
for regular index one systems in inﬁnite-horizon LQ diﬀerential games.
The following notation will be used. For an N-tuple ˆ F = ( ˆ F1,..., ˆ FN) ∈ Γ1 ×     × ΓN for given
sets Γi, we shall write ˆ F−i(α) = ( ˆ F1,..., ˆ Fi−1,α, ˆ Fi+1,..., ˆ FN) with α ∈ Γi.















with uj(t) = Fjxj(t), j = 1,...,N, and x satisfying E ˙ x(t) = Ax(t) +
 N
j=1 Bjuj(t), x(0) = x0.
Assume that Rij ≥ 0, i  = j, Rii > 0 and (F1,...,FN) ∈ FN, where
FN =
 
(F1,...,FN)| all ﬁnite eigenvalues of (E,A +
N  
j=1




has index one; and (E,A +
N  
j=1,j =i
BjFj) is regular and has index one i = 1,    ,N
 
.(30)
This last assumption spoils the rectangular structure of the strategy spaces, i.e. choices of feedback
matrices cannot be made independently. However, such a restriction is motivated by the fact that
closed-loop stability and avoidance of derivatives in the control actions is usually a common objective.
The notion of feedback Nash equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.1 An N-tuple F ∗ = (F ∗
1,...,F ∗
N) ∈ FN is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if for
all i = 1,...,N, Ji(x0,F ∗) ≤ Ji(x0,F ∗
−i(α)) for every consistent x0 and for each matrix α such that
F ∗
−i(α) ∈ FN. ￿


















, i = 1,    ,N. (31)
Let Bi1 := [Ir 0]Y T
i Bi, Bi2 := [0 In−r]Y T
i Bi, Xi =: [Xi1 Xi2], with Xi1 ∈











and ¯ Ri := Rii + BT
i2 ˜ Qi,22Bi2.
Next, consider the equations:
























i,12 = 0 (32)





















i1Pi) = Fi(I + Xi2Bi2Fi)
−1Xi1 (34)
Theorem 4.2, below, states that all feedback Nash equilibria are determined by the solutions of
(31-34).
Theorem 4.2 Assume (E,A) is regular and has index one, and (E,A,[B1     BN]) is ﬁnite dy-




i ), i = 1,    ,N solve (31-34) and ¯ Ri > 0. Then (F ∗
1,...,F ∗
N)
is a feedback Nash equilibrium. Conversely, assume Qi ≥ 07. Then, if (F ∗
1,...,F ∗
N) is a feedback
Nash equilibrium, there exist (Yi,Xi,Fi,Pi), i = 1,    ,N, solving (31-34) with Fi = F ∗
i .
Furthermore, if the game has a feedback Nash equilibrium the with this equilibrium corresponding cost




i0Pixi0, where xi0 = [Ir0]X
−1
i x0. (35)




i ), i = 1,    ,N solve (31-34). Next, consider the minimization by player




















subject to the system





j ))x(t) + BiFix(t), x(0) = x0. (37)
By assumption (E,A+
 N
j=1,j =i BjF ∗
j )) is regular and has index one. Furthermore, by (33), (E,A+
 N
j=1,j =i BjF ∗
j ),Bi) is ﬁnite dynamics stabilizable. So, with A := A +
 N
j=1,j =iBjF ∗
j ; B := Bi;




j and R := Rii in Theorem 3.1, we conclude that F ∗
i solves the above
minimization problem (36,37). The corresponding minimum cost is given by (35). This proves the
ﬁrst part of the claim.
7This assumption is made to ensure that matrix ¯ R > 0 in Theorem 3.1. Without this assumption one can just
conclude that this matrix is semi-positive deﬁnite. How to generalize this part of the theorem remains a subject of
future research.
13Next, assume that F ∗ := (F ∗
1,    ,F ∗





for every consistent x0 and for each matrix Fi such that F ∗
−i(Fi) ∈ FN. Or, stated diﬀerently, F ∗
i








j ),Bi) is ﬁnite dynamics stabilizable (see also footnote 2). Hence, by Theorem
3.1, there exists real symmetric matrices (Yi,Xi,F ∗
i ,Pi), i = 1,    ,N, solving (31-34). ￿
Example 4.3 To illustrate Theorem 4.2 we reconsider Example 3.4. Assume that an external com-
pany is hired who is responsible for the daily operating of the machine. Since the revenues of this
company are closely related to those of the owner of the machine, we consider a similar objective











Straightforward, though lengthy, calculations show that the set of feedback Nash equilibria for this
game are parameterized by (s,u), where u  = 0 and s ∈













Here, with r2 :=
θf
θ+(1−θ)ǫ and w1 := (δ + s)2 + 1
θl(−1 + s2(r2α2 + γ1)), a2 = αst −
√
w1. Next
introduce a1 := −s − δ, e := α2r4 + γ3 + r3(1 − αt)2, h := a2e + αr3t(a2 + δ)(1 − αt) and w2 :=
h2+α2t2((−γ2+r3(a2+δ)2)e−r2













































w2); A1 = a1; A2 = a2 and t =
2θlr3w1 −
√
w1(r3(δ + s) + s(α2r4 + γ3))
α(s2(−θlr4α2 − θlγ3 + r3γ + r2r3α2) − r3 + θlγ2)
.
The cost associated with equilibrium (39) are for player one θls2
0(a1 +
√





w2), where s0 = [1 0]x0.
In Figure 2 we visualized the set of feedback Nash equilibria for some speciﬁc choice of parameters.
Obviously, players will only participate in the game if their revenues will be positive. Furthermore,
solutions that are left from (J1,J2) ≈ (0.5,0.18) are not Pareto eﬃcient. So, this example clearly
demonstrates that in general there may exist an inﬁnite number of feasible feedback Nash equilibria.
Numerical computations show that the value for which the norm of F1 is minimal within the feasible
region is attained at that point where the revenues of player 2 become zero. Furthermore, elementary
calculations show that for a ﬁxed choice of the parameter s, the norm of F2 is minimized at u = s2+1
α .
So, assuming additionally that the players both will try to minimize the norm of their feedback gain
matrix does not provide a unique equilibrium solution in this case. To arrive at a unique equilibrium
solution it seems realistic, given the context of this problem, to assume that players will look for








Figure 2: Set of feedback Nash equilibria Example 4.3, with δ = 0.1; s0 = α = 1; γ = γ3 = r1 =
2; r2 = r4 = 10; γ2 = 0.9; r3 = 1.5.
diﬀerent criteria involving robustness properties of the strategies w.r.t. ǫ. However, this remains a
subject for future research.
Finally notice that by choosing diﬀerent parameters in this model sometimes a unique Pareto eﬃcient
equilibrium exists, whereas also parameterizations exist where no solution exists (assuming that both
players will only engage if they make proﬁts). ￿
5 Concluding Remarks
In this note we considered the problem to ﬁnd a static stabilizing state feedback controller for an
index one descriptor system. We derived both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of such a controller. In general this controller is not uniquely determined. We illustrated this in an
example. The solvability conditions are formulated in terms of a transformed system. A suﬃcient
condition in terms of the original model parameters was provided too.
The equivalence result has been used to formulate both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a linear state feedback Nash equilibrium in a diﬀerential game setting. This under the
assumption that the players have perfect state feedback information.
Since the optimal solution is usually not uniquely determined the question arises how this freedom can
be exploited to select amongst these optimal solutions one that has some additional nice properties
(like e.g. robustness or minimum norm as we did in our example (see e.g. [1]). This characterization
could then be exploited too to derive a numerical eﬃcient procedure for calculating such a solution.
Moreover this property could be useful to formulate a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
This remains a topic for future research. Another open problem is how to generalize these results for
descriptor systems that have a higher order index.
156 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.3












˜ K + X
















































2 ] ˜ K
 
˜ x(t).










. Then it follows directly from (41) that K1 = L1 and L4 = K4 = 0.
Next notice that F in (23) satisﬁes F = −R−1[BT
1 BT
2 ] ˜ KX−1. From this it follows immediately that
RFX1 = −(B
T
1 L1 + B
T
2 K2) and RFX2 = −B
T
2 K3. (42)
Using (42), a simple expansion of (40) shows that the matrices Li and Ki satisfy




1 QX1 + (L1B1 + L2B2)FX1 (43)
0 = L2 + X
T
1 QX2 + (L1B1 + L2B2)FX2 (44)
0 = K2 + X
T
2 QX1 + L3B2FX1 (45)
0 = L3 + K3 + X
T
2 QX2 + L3B2FX2. (46)
Next introduce, consistent with the previous notation, G := I +B2FX2; ˜ G := I +X2B2F; and ˆ G :=
I + FX2B2. Then, by Lemma 2.3,
X2G
−1 = ˜ G
−1X2 and X2B2 ˆ G
−1 = ˜ G
−1X2B2. (47)
Then post-multiplying (44) by B2 we obtain L2B2 ˆ G = −(XT
1 Q + L1B1F)X2B2. Or, using (47),
L2B2 = −(X
T
1 Q + L1B1F)X2B2 ˆ G
−1 = −(X
T
1 Q + L1B1F) ˜ G
−1X2B2. (48)
Using (42), pre-multiplication of (46) by BT
2 gives BT
2 L3G = −BT
2 K3 − BT
2 XT
2 QX2 = (RF −
BT
2 XT
2 Q)X2. Therefore, using (47), we get
B
T









2 Q) ˜ G
−1X2. (49)
Pre-multiplication of (45) by BT
2 yields BT
2 K2 = −BT
2 XT
2 QX1 − BT
2 L3B2FX1. So, using (49),
B
T


















2 Q) ˜ G
−1(−I + I + X2B2F)X1




2 Q) ˜ G
−1X1 − RFX1. (50)


















2 Q ˜ G ˜ G




2 Q) ˜ G
−1X1 = − ¯ RF ˜ G
−1X1. (51)





1 L1+Q11, we obtain
then from (43), using (48) and (51) respectively, that L1 satisﬁes
0 = A
T
1L1 + L1A + X
T
1 QX1 + (L1B1 + L2B2)FX1
= P − Q12B2 ¯ R
−1B
T





12 + L1B1 ¯ R
−1B
T
1 L1 + L1B1FX1
−(X
T
1 Q + L1B1F) ˜ G
−1X2B2FX1
= P − Q12B2 ¯ R
−1B
T









+L1B1F(I + X2B2F) ˜ G
−1X1 − (X
T
1 Q + L1B1F)X2B2F ˜ G
−1X1





12 − ¯ RF ˜ G
−1X1 − B
T












Since by assumption L1 is symmetric, clearly L1 and F satisfy (14,15).
So by Theorem 3.1 the cost are xT
1L1x1. To see that these correspond with xT
0LEx0 we ﬁrst rewrite



















































, EX2 = 0. Since, moreover, L4 = 0 it follows that



















So, combining both results we have that XT
2 LEX = 0 or, equivalently, XT











XTLE = XTLE. Clearly the last equality
holds if and only if XT
2 LE = 0, which was shown above to be the case. ￿
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